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ABSTRACT. Collaborative management of natural resources involves two or more parties working together to govern and/or manage
a set of resources within a defined area. Although a number of collaborative management frameworks have been developed for protected
area and fisheries management, few exist for freshwater resources that enable their comparative analysis. We present a framework of
collaborative management for freshwater resources comprising three elements: scope, governance, and management. Application of
the framework to 11 cases from Australia and New Zealand differentiates between primarily consultation/government-based
arrangements through to cogovernance arrangements. Our framework differs from others because it highlights the multiscalar and
nested nature of collaborative management arrangements that influence effective water resource management. Our analysis highlights
the diversity of arrangements that exist for freshwater resource management. Cases involving indigenous groups, a social tradition of
waterways management, and those outside the scope of national water resource management reforms generally had higher levels of
power sharing and involvement. We argue for greater attention to the effectiveness of and links between governance and management
processes to ensure collaborative management remains innovative and appropriate to context. We contribute a framework that contains
a continua and three core elements that enables a parsimonious evaluation that could be applied to other resource management contexts
and, thus avoids criticism of overly prescriptive, simplistic, and idealistic analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly recognized that successful environmental
management requires a holistic perspective that engages
community, industry, and government. In response, many forms
of cooperative-, collaborative-, joint-, and comanagement and
governance have emerged. For the purposes of this article, we
define collaborative management as “a partnership by which two
or more relevant social actors collectively negotiate, agree upon,
guarantee and implement a fair share of management functions,
benefits and responsibilities for a particular territory, area or set
of natural resources” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004:69).
Collaborative management is not a new approach, having been
applied in fisheries, forestry, and protected area management for
around a century (Agrawal 1995, Jentoft and McCay 1995,
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Despite also being commonly
applied in freshwater management, comparative analyses are
largely absent from the academic literature (but see Eberhard et
al. 2017).  
The purpose of this article is to contrast contemporary and
innovative collaborative arrangements. We do so through the
development of a framework that compares scope, governance,
and management along a power-sharing continuum. This
framework provides a rapid method for identifying and sharing
lessons on the collaborative management of natural resources.
We illustrate its application using freshwater management cases
from two different countries: a federation of self-governing states
in Australia, and, in the case of New Zealand, a Westminster-style
government with national, regional, and local tiers. Both
governments recognize the rights of indigenous peoples, in
Australia through native title and in New Zealand through the
Treaty of Waitangi settlement process (Jacobson et al. 2014).
Through framework application, we demonstrate enhanced
understanding about the drivers that shape the nature of
collaborative management arrangements and provide critical
insights that will inform future freshwater management
internationally.  
Collaboration in governance and management of natural
resources has occurred since the 1890s (Jentoft and McCay 1995),
and incorporates a suite of terms such as comanagement,
cooperative management, and cogovernance of natural resources.
Comanagement refers to formalized power sharing arrangements
(Armitage et al. 2007); in some contexts, e.g., Australia,
comanagement refers principally to relationships between
indigenous peoples and the nation state, as per protected area
management. In instances where formalized arrangements, either
statutory or voluntary, do not exist, are limited in scope, or are
unequal between collaborating parties, the term cooperative or
collaborative management is used. More recently, the term
cogovernance has been used, although this generally refers to
formal agreements for sharing of decision-making powers, but
not necessarily responsibility for implementing, regulating, or
enforcing actions agreed to. Cogovernance provides an attempt
to increase deliberation and participation in decision making, and
may or may not increase legitimacy of disenfranchized rights,
depending on who is engaged in the arrangement (Brinbaum
2016). Thus, we use the term “collaborative management” in
reference to a full suite of arrangements, of which comanagement
and cogovernance are two. Our use is categorical rather than
hierarchical, given that there is no singular definition of each
term, and that the appropriateness of any term or set of
arrangements is subjective in judgement (see Takeda and Røpke
2010).
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COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Approaches to collaborative management are diverse because of
its emergence from the management of multiple natural resources
types, and from multiple socio-political contexts. Community and
state can interact in collaborative management in partnership, in
joint organizations, or in nested systems (Carlsson and Berkes
2005). Detailed descriptive models have been developed. For
example, Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004) incorporate 18
elements into their framework, linked to context (three rights
sets), components (preconditions, characteristics, and outcomes),
and linking methods, with multiple feedbacks. Simpler continua,
frameworks, and typologies of collaborative management have
also been developed that support lesson sharing and improvement
of practice. Borrini-Feyerabend (1996), for instance, described
collaborative management as a range of approaches along a
continuum from full agency control to full stakeholder control,
with the latter involving increased contribution, commitment,
and accountability of stakeholders facilitated by fully devolved
management. Sen and Nielsen (1996) identify a similar continuum
of practice for collaborative management of fisheries that varies
on the basis of power sharing; it can be instructive or consultative
(i.e., communities are consulted and inform government
decisions), advisory (where a group has specific input into
management decisions but no power), cooperative (where
communities and government are partners in decision making),
or informative (where responsibilities are delegated to
communities).  
In the Australian context, Smyth (2001) and Szabo and Smyth
(2003) depict three different models of collaborative protected
area management. These vary in relation to ownership,
management planning, the voluntary/optional nature of
arrangements, with whom land management authority resides,
costs and security of arrangements. Alternatively, Hill et al. (2012)
classify collaborative management between indigenous peoples
and government as a position in a three dimensional space
generated by consideration of power-sharing, intercultural
purpose, and inclusiveness of participation. The common
elements in these approaches to conceptualizing comanagement
include power sharing, governance (rule setting), management
(implementation), and relational context (context). The latter is
important, given the criticisms of idealized depictions of
comanagement that fail to account for changes in
interrelationships between actors over time, the lack of critical
reflection on whether power sharing is consensual, and parallel
arrangements (Fischer et al. 2014).  
Although typologies exist for the collaborative management of
fisheries, wildlife, and protected areas management, few similar
analytical frameworks exist for freshwater management.
Margerum and Robinson (2015), building from Margerum
(2008), classify arrangements as action, organization, or policy
level, and either as cooperative or coordinated. However, the full
range of collaborative approaches evident in other typologies are
not covered by Margerum and Robinson’s framework, nor are
emerging multiscalar collaborative approaches that can include
policy, organization, and action based responses, e.g.,
collaborative management of Te Waihora in New Zealand
(Memon and Kirk 2012).  
Collaborative management, however, has emerged as an
important means of managing both water quality and quantity.
Analyses tend to emphasize whether the resource is managed
effectively in accordance with principles for common property
resources (Ostrom 1990). Although analysis in relation to
common pool resource management principles can be used to
assess the effectiveness of arrangements, it does not provide for
nuanced analysis of similarities and differences, nor does it aid in
generating new understanding about the divergent contextual
drivers specifically within water management contexts;
framework type analyses may be more useful in this regard.
JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT
Comparing collaborative management across countries requires
an understanding of the jurisdictional context. Ongoing drought
in Australia has hastened reforms targeted at greater coordination
of water management regimes across jurisdictions. At the state
level, these reforms have typically required a statutory response,
e.g., the 1989 Water Act (State Government of Victoria 1989) or
the 2000 Water Act (State Government of Queensland 2000) and
reinforced top-down water planning in which stakeholder input
is largely limited to an advisory role. The Australian water
management landscape has been shaped by several macro drivers
including (1) the Australian Constitution; (2) commitment to
market-based mechanisms; (3) severe drought conditions; and (4)
regional approaches to natural resource management. Section 100
of the Australian Constitution specifies that responsibility for
water management resides with the state and territory
governments. When viewed in historical context, water policies
and management mechanisms have differed markedly between
Australian jurisdictions as state and territory governments
pursued their individual priorities (Pigram 2006). Notwithstanding
contemporary reforms that have been targeted toward increased
coordination between Australian jurisdictions, these legacies
continue to shape water management arrangements. Australian
water management is also characterized by a commitment to
statutory-based water planning and complex market-based
arrangements (see the 1994 Council of Australian Governments’
water reform framework and the Intergovernmental Agreement
on a National Water Initiative 2004).  
The context is different for New Zealand where the Resource
Management Act 1991 (Government of New Zealand 1991) sets
the framework for an integrated approach to planning for
sustainable resource management, and appearing to seamlessly
link national, regional, and local government planning. It also
“enshrined” indigenous interests in planning and environmental
management, following significant claims around water and
coastal fisheries degradation brought by indigenous Māori tribes
under the Treaty of Waitangi (Jacobson et al. 2016a). The
relationship enshrined in the RMA was an early signal of
collaborative arrangements to come in New Zealand’s freshwater
management, and of the role Māori were to play in these. This
signal has been further driven by the National Policy Statement
for Freshwater Management (Ministry for the Environment 2014)
which included specific mention of Te Mana o te Wai, the status
and importance of water to Māori.
METHODS
There are numerous examples of collaborative water resource
management in Australia and New Zealand. To effectively
illustrate the use of our analytic framework we selected a range
of management examples based on process, design, and
geography. The following criteria were used to select cases:  
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. The collaborative group has an instrumental function, e.g.
developing a management plan, with membership reaching
beyond government; 
. A diversity of current and innovative (collaborative
management) arrangements within each country are
represented; 
. Examples from each country where multiple collaborative
arrangements exist within the same catchment; 
. Sufficient information was available to enable analysis; and 
. Geographic diversity is represented, i.e., across Australian
states/territories and including the North and South Islands
of New Zealand. 
Using these criteria, 11 collaborative freshwater management
arrangements were chosen and subjected to document analysis
(Fig. 1, Tables 1 and 2). Seven cases were from Australia and four
from New Zealand and were believed sufficient to develop and
test a framework to inform future development of freshwater
collaborative management arrangements and provide insight to
deliver on the aims of this paper.
Fig. 1. Location of the 11 collaborative groups.
Our Australian cases exclude (1) examples of community owned
water infrastructure, e.g., irrigation schemes; (2) examples from
New South Wales where freshwater management occurs at the
catchment scale, but community involvement is largely limited to
public consultation and does not allow for nongovernment
stakeholders to participate in an advisory role; and (3) the
Murray-Darling Basin, given that it is a unique arrangement
involving the Australian state/territory governments referring
their constitutional water management powers to the Australian
Commonwealth Government. The latter in particular is an
unusual set of arrangements that can only be applied given (i) this
is both an environmental matter of national importance, (ii)
because the catchment crosses state boundaries and therefore a
case could be made beyond the powers subscribed to individual
states under federation, and (iii) because there is no comparison
in New Zealand.  
Almost any natural resource management body could arguably
fit these criteria but we have chosen one case study per state given
contextual differences in the way each addresses freshwater
management. Based on the exploratory nature of our framework,
not all possible cases from across Australia have been included,
which is a limitation of the research. Our New Zealand cases
exclude regional government planning processes, and two
additional major cases: the Guardians of Manapouri, with its
focus on water quantity rather than water quality, and the
Motueka Integrated Catchment Management process, because
of limited scope of analysis and our interest in a diversity of
arrangements. We have also excluded the Ngāi Tahu Crown
Settlement Act 1998 mandated Joint Management Plan
arrangement between Ngāi Tahu and the Department of
Conservation for public conservation lands on the lake margin of
Te Waihora, given that the current cogovernance arrangements
are much broader in physical scope. Thus, the framework we
developed could similarly be applied to sharing lessons from
programs where state government or equivalent is working with
traditional owners under statutory mandates to implement
collaborative freshwater management.
Data collection
A two-phase desktop review of water management arrangements
was conducted for each case. First, case-specific and other
relevant web sites were searched for information applicable to
each case, as well as information pertaining to legislation and
policy arrangements at national, state/territory (Australia), and
regional (New Zealand) scales. All information was recorded in
a spreadsheet against the categories outlined in the data analysis
section to facilitate cross-case comparisons. Second, a search of
the academic literature was conducted using three databases:
Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar, for any other
analyses related to these cases. The first 100 hits retrieved from
the Google Scholar searches were inspected for broad relevance
to the project. After scanning all relevant documents from both
phases, we created a master file of core references for each case
(Appendix 1).
Data analysis
We created a framework matrix to support case analysis. The y-
axis represents a continuum of power sharing, based on Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. (2004) and Sen and Nielsen (1996), moving from
consultation/government-based (top of the continuum) to
cogovernance (bottom of the continuum), and an x-axis covering
scope, governance, and management. The terms used in this
matrix are those typically used in both Australia and New
Zealand. We positioned cases along this continuum, based on
assessments of their characteristics. Although power sharing
provided a useful means to classify cases, relative positioning also
required us to consider the scope of participation across the
breadth of management activities and the statutory nature of the
group. The elements on the x-axis encompass the range of
responsibilities and actions, and characteristics and behaviors,
encompassed within all known approaches to collaborative water
management being undertaken in Australasia (see Jacobson et al.
2014).
Scope
Arrangements vary in purpose, time frame, and the extent to
which they address either water quality or water quantity issues
(or both). Arrangements also differ in terms of governance, with
processes operating at national, state, regional, and local scales.
Specifically there are three subelements: purpose, time frame, and
Ecology and Society 22(4): 28
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss4/art28/
Table 1. Descriptive context of the Australian collaborative groups.
 
Purpose Physical scope Mandate
Derwent Estuary Program, Tasmania (DEP)
Develop and implement an
environmental strategy for the estuary
The Derwent Estuary between New Norfolk (upstream)
and a line between Tinderbox and the Iron Pot
(downstream).
Note: Although the estuary is a brackish water body, it
includes a significant freshwater component.
Derwent Estuary Partnership Agreement
Fitzroy Partnership for River Health, Queensland (FPRH)
To monitor and evaluate the health of
the river basin
The Fitzroy Basin. Includes shallow groundwater, rivers,
off-stream wetlands, and estuaries in the Fitzroy Basin
and near-shore coastal and marine environments.
Fitzroy Partnership for River Health
Memorandum of Understanding; Fitzroy
Partnership for River Health Operating
Rules
Fitzroy Basin Community Reference Panel, Queensland (FB)
Make recommendations for inclusion
in 10-year plan
The Fitzroy Basin. Surface water and some groundwater
management areas.
Water Act 2000 (State Government of
Queensland 2000)
Glenelg-Hopkins Catchment Management Authority Advisory Group, Victoria (GH)
Make recommendations for inclusion
in 8-year strategy
The Glenelg Hopkins region covers approximately
26,910 km² from Ballarat in the east to the border of
South Australia in the west. And stretching from the
southern coast of Victoria to the townships of Harrow
and Ararat in the north.
Water Act 1989 (State Government of
Victoria 1989)
Katherine Water Advisory Committee, Northern Territory (KWAC)
Make recommendations for inclusion
in 10-year plan; different committee
reviews plan
The Plan applies to water contained within the
unconfined and confined Tindall Limestone Aquifer
within the Katherine River Catchment. It does not
directly apply to the management of surface water
extractions.
Water Act (Government of Northern
Territory 1992)
Lower Limestone Coast Water Allocation Plan Reference Group, South Australia (LLC)
Water Allocation Plan for the Lower
Limestone Coast Prescribed Wells
Area 2013
Two distinct underground water systems spanning
1,450,000 hectares in southeast South Australia.
Extending from the coast east to the Victorian border
and north to Padthaway.
Natural Resource Management Act 2004
(State Government of South Australia
2004)
Swan River Trust, Western Australia (SRT)
To manage the health of the Swan
Canning River through plan
development and reporting
The Swan and Canning rivers flow through the Perth
metropolitan area. The catchment accounts for 2090 km²
including the Swan Canning Riverpark, which is 72.1
km² of public land and adjoining river reserve.
Swan and Canning Rivers Management
Act 2006 (State Government of Western
Australia 2006)
water values. We attempted to weight the relative emphasis on
particular water values, e.g., ecosystem health, recreation, or
cultural, to indicate the broader role of freshwater in the delivery
of ecosystem benefits and values the groups believed were most
important to manage for. We used a three-category scoring
system, from one star (low level of emphasis) to three stars (high
level of emphasis).
Governance
Collaborative management, as we define it, involves the
establishment of a new body or group(s), sometimes with
decision-making authority. These groups vary in relation to eight
subelements:  
. Group membership, representation, and decision-making
processes; 
. Establishment of subgroups, resulting in nested
arrangements; 
. Inclusion of indigenous representatives; 
. Statutory nature; 
. Group mandate; 
. Resourcing; 
. Ability to adapt governance arrangements; and 
. Transparency of governance 
Management
Although the focus of collaborative management can be on either
or both of governance and management, the inclusion of
monitoring and evaluation of both process (e.g., Izurieta et al.
2011) and actions (Hockings et al. 2004) facilitates transparent
governance and management and recognizes that both are
learning processes (Berkes 2009). We assessed the existence of
each in case studies as evidenced through reporting. Thus there
are two subelements: monitoring and reporting.
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Table 2. Descriptive context of the New Zealand collaborative groups.
 
Purpose Physical scope Mandate
Selwyn Waihora Zone Committee (SWZC)
Consultation, assessment, and
decision making around the zone
implementation program that sets
maximum nutrient loadings and
minimum flow regimes for the river
Selwyn, Waikirikiri, Waimakariri, Rakaia, Wilberforce,
Harper-Avoca, Lake Coleridge, Waianiwaniwa, Hororata,
Hawkins rivers and lowlands streams and water that flows
into Te Waihora, and are bounded by the Selwyn District
Council Government Boundary
Canterbury Water Management Strategy
2009
Te Waihora Governance Group (TWGG)
Provide for an enduring, collaborative
relationship between the Parties, for
the collaborative sharing of functions,
duties, and powers to commit to
enhance the practice of sustainable
management within the catchment
Relationships between Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu,
Environment Canterbury and Selwyn District Council to
work in partnership to implement their responsibilities
(statutory and cultural) within the Catchment including
the lake. Excludes the Joint Management Plan
arrangement under the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act
1998 (Government of New Zealand 1998).
Te Waihora Co-Governance Agreement
2014
TANK
To enable present and future
generations to gain the greatest social,
economic, recreational, and cultural
benefits from our water resources
within an environmentally sustainable
framework
Tutaekuri, Ahuriri, Ngaruroro and Karamu rivers and the
Heretaunga Plain Aquifer System, including making
recommendations on the flow regime, water allocation,
surface and ground water quality, involvement of Tangata
Whenua in decision making, Mātauranga Māori in
monitoring and reporting, security of water supply for
water users, and policies affecting freshwater management
Collaborative decision making for the
freshwater resources in the greater
Heretaunga and Ahuriri region (2014)
Waikato River Authority (WRA)
Restore and protect the health and
well-being of the river for future
generations
The river and activities within its catchment affecting the
river and tributaries, lakes, and wetlands commercial and
noncommercial fisheries managed under the Fisheries Act
1996 (Government of New Zealand 1996)
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu (Waikato
River) Settlement Act 2010 (Government
of New Zealand 2010);
Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te
Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010
(Government of New Zealand 2010)
Nga Wai o Maniapoto (Waipa River)
Act 2012 (Government of New Zealand
2012)
RESULTS
Framework
The 11 cases analyzed fit along a continuum from those that are
largely consultation/government-based and to those that
demonstrate a range of attributes that are more cogovernance in
nature. The analysis in this section is based on a reading of each
of the scope, governance, and management elements from left to
right in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Scope
Groups engaged more at the consultation end of the continuum
have typically narrower scope, e.g., less emphasis on recreation
and cultural values, than the much more inclusive groups at the
cogovernance end of the continuum (Table 3). The relative
weighting of emphasis between the management of water quality
and quantity differs overall between Australia and New Zealand.
In Australia there is typically either equal consideration given to
both or more emphasis on quantity; conversely in New Zealand
the emphasis is more around quality. The four New Zealand cases
are also more encompassing of integrated natural resource
management (including freshwater) than most Australian cases.
In all New Zealand cases, there is an almost equal consideration
of three to four values, with recreation the least considered,
particularly in those that emphasize indigenous partnerships,
whereas in Australia, economic and ecosystem health values are
emphasized.  
Groups tend to provide recommendations to the applicable state
(Australian cases) or regional council (New Zealand cases) about
the content of the statutory plan (typically covering a 5–10 year
time frame). Exceptions were those groups typically focused on
cogovernance, i.e., Fitzroy Partnership for River Health (FPRH),
Derwent Estuary Program (DEP), and Waikato River Authority
(WRA).  
It was sometimes difficult to determine the “life” of the group.
Cases at the bottom of the continuum have a more enduring
status, beyond the life of recommendations made and plan
completion. Conversely, those toward the top appeared to mostly
only survive for the plan recommendation stage, and not for plan
implementation and review. Thus, the clustering of Australian
cases toward the top of the continuum shows the shorter, more
determinate life of these groups.
Governance
Moving from consultation/government-based to cogovernance in
Tables 4 and 5, the most obvious distinction is a shift away from
a planning advisory function, and toward a role that involves
either more of a quality assurance, e.g., the Fitzroy Basin Report
Card (Fitzroy Partnership for River Health [date unknown]) or a
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Table 4. Categorization of collaborative groups along the consultation/government-based to cogovernance continuum: 
Governance subelements (1-4). 
 
 Governance Subelements (1-4) 
 
 Group membership Establishment of subgroups Indigenous 
representation 
Statutory/ 
nonstatutory 
C
o
n
su
lt
at
io
n
/G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t-
b
as
ed
 
FB 
(Aus.) 
State government appointed. Not specified Not specified Statutory 
LLC 
(Aus.) 
NRM† Board responsible for plan 
preparation. Appoints water allocation 
plan Reference Group. 
Reference Group comprises 
representatives from forestry, 
and agricultural industries and 
the SA† Farmers’ Federation 
and the Conservation Council 
of South Australia. 
One member of the 
NRM Board must 
represent the 
interests of 
Aboriginal people. 
Statutory 
KWAC 
(Aus.) 
Advisory Committee established 
under Territory legislation; 13 
members. 
Technical Expert Group. Other 
technical advisors as required. 
Committee includes 
two indigenous 
representatives. 
Statutory 
TANK 
(NZ) 
Committee appointed by Hawkes Bay 
Regional Council. 30 representatives; 
broad based. 
Not specified Ten indigenous 
representatives 
decided by the 
Tangata Whenua.‡ 
Statutory 
GH 
(Aus.) 
CMA† responsible for strategy 
preparation. Appoints advisory group 
with community (5) and agency or 
industry representatives (5), plus 
indigenous community nominee (1). 
Not specified One indigenous 
community nominee 
on advisory group. 
Statutory 
 FPRH 
(Aus.) 
Voluntary membership (includes 
industry, universities, state, and local 
governments). Partnership hosted by 
nonstatutory NRM group.  
Management committee 
(nominees from partners); 
science advisory panel; 
technical network. 
None, but 
partnership open to 
all interested 
parties. 
Nonstatutory 
MOU† 
 DEP 
(Aus.) 
State and local governments, industry, 
universities. 
Steering Committee; Technical 
Working Group; advisory 
issues-based groups as required. 
None Nonstatutory 
MOU† 
C
o
g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 
S-WZC 
(NZ) 
Committee includes representatives 
from Tangata Whenua‡ (5), Te 
R nanga o Ng i Tahu‡ (1), district 
council (1), regional council (1), 
community (6). 
Subsidiary nonspecified focus 
groups that inform the 
committee. 
Yes, as members of 
the committee 
Statutory 
terms of 
reference 
SRT 
(Aus.) 
Board comprises state government 
appointees (6), one appointed by 
minister (but nominated by WA LGA† 
Association), and CEO of appropriate 
state government department. 
River Protection Advisory 
Committee includes relevant 
agency representatives. Other 
subgroups formed as required. 
No indigenous 
representatives on 
Board 
Statutory trust 
TWGG 
(NZ) 
Governance group includes 
representatives from regional 
government (4), district government 
(1) and Tangata Whenua‡ (5). 
Joint committee (regional 
government [2]; Te R nanga of 
Ng i Tahu‡ [2]) oversees 
ecological and cultural 
restoration program. 
50% Indigenous 
representation 
Nonstatutory 
MOU† 
WRA 
(NZ) 
Authority includes representatives 
from Iwi‡ (5), regional council 
nominees (2), and three others 
(nominated on advice from national 
government). 
Includes Waikato River Clean-
up Trust, which manages a 
competitive restoration fund. 
50% Indigenous 
representation 
Statutory 
NOTES: 
FB = Fitzroy Basin Community Reference Panel; LLC = Lower Limestone Coast Water Allocation Plan; KWAC = Katherine 
Water Advisory Committee; TANK = TANK; GH = Glenelg-Hopkins Catchment Management Authority Advisory Group; FPRH 
= Fitzroy Partnership for River Health; DEP = Derwent Estuary Program; S-WZC = Selwyn Waihora Zone Committee; SRT = 
Swan River Trust; TWGG = Te Waihora Governance Group; WRA = Waikato River Authority 
† CMA = catchment management authority, LGA = local government area, MOU = memorandum of understanding, NRM = 
natural resource management, SA = South Australia, WA = Western Australia 
‡ The term ‘tangata whenua’ refers to M ori people from a particular area/place; Iwi refers to tribal group; and Ng i Tahu is a 
specific Iwi that includes Te Waihora and tributaries within its tribal area. 
within its tribal area.   
Table 5. Categorization of collaborative groups along the consultation/government-based to cogovernance continuum: 
Governance subelements (5-8). 
  Governance Subelements (5-8) 
  Group mandate Resourcing Process allows for adaptation Transparency of governance 
C
o
n
su
lt
a
ti
o
n
/G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t-
b
as
e
d
 FB 
(Aus.) 
Community reference 
panel provides advice/ 
recommendations to 
Minister. 
State government No, but plan expires after 10 years 
unless the Minister postpones the 
expiry. The Minster can also amend 
or replace plans at any time (subject 
to the provisions of the Water Act 
2000). 
Consultation report available 
outlining how submissions were 
considered. No minutes available 
online for community reference 
panel. 
LLC 
(Aus.) 
Ministerial sign-off 
required. 
State government No, but plan reviewed within 10 
years of adoption 
More than 40 meetings held with 
stakeholders. Written submission 
process. Not available online. 
KWAC 
(Aus.) 
Ministerial sign-off 
required. 
Territory government No, but five-yearly review of water 
allocation plan. New advisory 
committee appointed for plan 
review. 
Advisory Committee minutes 
available online. Community and 
stakeholder meetings, written 
submission process. 
TANK 
(NZ) 
Provides 
recommendations to 
Council, which generally 
accepts them providing 
they are consistent with 
legislation/policy. 
Regional government Evidence of changes to group 
management especially for Tangata 
Whenua‡; changes to terms of 
reference have occurred. 
Minutes online (but not up-to-
date) and published reports. 
GH 
(Aus.) 
Advisory Group 
provides advice to the 
CMA† board and senior 
management. 
State government Three-yearly Advisory Group 
review. Adaptive management 
cycle incorporated into the 
Waterway Strategy. 
Advisory Group is responsible for 
conveying information about the 
CMA1 and its activities to the 
community. No records available 
online. 
 FPRH 
(Aus.) 
Resides with partners. Self-funded MOU† may be reviewed /modified 
subject to written mutual consent of 
all parties. 
No public meetings. Annual 
report cards available online. 
 DEP 
(Aus.) 
Partnership reviewed 
every five years. 
State government and 
partners 
No, but biennial review of 
implementation; five-year 
management plan revision. 
Strategies and plans available 
online, no meeting minutes. 
C
o
g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 
S-WZC 
(NZ) 
Only makes 
recommendations but 
seldom ignored. 
Regional and district 
councils 
Roll-over process for membership 
is defined; committee numbers can 
be changed. 
Agenda and minutes of all 
meetings are available online. 
SRT 
(Aus.) 
Ministerial sign-off 
required. 
State government funds 
two-thirds, participants 
fund one-third 
Unclear, but plan reviewed every 
five years. 
Minutes not available online. 
Consulted 500+ community 
members, 21 LGAs†, & 15 state 
organizations. 
TWGG 
(NZ) 
Final, requires majority 
government and Tangata 
Whenua‡ agreement. 
Equal resourcing 
between parties 
Not specified, but the process has 
been adapted between interim and 
final arrangements. 
Not specified 
WRA 
(NZ) 
Jointly decide binding 
recommendations for the 
strategy and other 
functions. 
Presumed from national 
government as part of 
Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement 
Statutory Annual report (available online) 
includes financial and related 
matters. 
 
NOTES: 
FB = Fitzroy Basin Community Reference Panel; LLC = Lower Limestone Coast Water Allocation Plan; KWAC = Katherine Water 
Advisory Committee; TANK = TANK; GH = Glenelg-Hopkins Catchment Management Authority Advisory Group; FPRH = Fitzroy 
Partnership for River Health; DEP = Derwent Estuary Program; S-WZC = Selwyn Waihora Zone Committee; SRT = Swan River Trust; 
TWGG = Te Waihora Governance Group; WRA = Waikato River Authority 
† CMA = catchment management authority, LGA = local government area, MOU = memorandum of understanding, NRM = natural 
resource management, SA = South Australia, WA = Western Australia 
‡ The term ‘tangata whenua’ refers to M ori people from a particular area/place; Iwi refers to tribal group; and Ng i Tahu is a specific Iwi 
that includes Te Waihora and tributaries within its tribal area. 
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more holistic role. For example, Swan River Trust’s (SRT) role
includes management plan development, implementation, and
review oversight, WRA’s includes administration of a competitive
natural resource management fund, e.g., $6m in the 2015 round
(Waikato River Authority 2015), and the capacity to manage river
fisheries (commercial and customary) that fall under the Fisheries
Act 1996 (Government of New Zealand 1996).  
In all of the cases, governance group arrangements are normally
specified through either memorandum of understanding or terms
of reference, through the formation of a specific trust or
equivalent, or sometimes specified through law, e.g. settlements
such as WRA; we refer to these collectively as “agreements.”
However, the type of agreement does not appear to vary in relation
to the extent of power sharing. Group sizes vary from seven to
an unlimited size, with no apparent variation along the
continuum. In one Australian case (FPRH), membership occurs
in three classes based upon level of resourcing provided to the
partnership (Fitzroy Partnership for River Health 2013). Cases
falling toward the cogovernance end of the continuum were more
likely to have a nongovernment appointment process, for example,
through indigenous groups determining their own appointments
(WRA), through cash contribution (e.g., FPRH), or through
elective processes (e.g., DEP), but not in all cases; in the SRT, an
example of a community-based collaboration, appointments are
still made by government.  
Subgroups typically exist in arrangements located toward the
cogovernance end of the continuum, which provide for delegation
of particular governance functions. In some cases the specific
nature of these is outlined in agreements, while in other cases the
capacity to do so is merely mentioned. In general, these groups
report to the main collaborative group rather than having
authority in their own right. In the case of Te Waihora
Governance Group (TWGG), an example of cogovernance, an
additional “joint officials group” exists to support the
implementation of a range of functional decisions made by the
group; thus the arrangement is unique in specifying and
overseeing a series of collaborative practices which, through their
nature, should support partnered management.  
In some cases, once again particularly toward the cogovernance
end of the continuum, decision-making methods are specified; in
other cases they are not. For example, the WRA agreement
identifies that members must reach decisions pursuing consensus
decision making (Government of New Zealand 2010; Schedule
6.9); although it provides detailed conflict management
mechanisms, it fails to specify exactly what “consensus” decision
making involves. In contrast, the TWGG arrangement defines
consensus decision making as a majority of each of the party
types: indigenous and government (combined local and
regional).  
Funding for arrangements also shifts from government toward
greater partner cofinancing (or derived from settlement) as they
move toward cogovernance. All nonstatutory arrangements
provide for adaptation of governance arrangements, usually on
a five year time frame; this has already occurred in the TWGG
and DEP. In some cases, particularly in New Zealand, the
workings of these groups are transparent to outside parties, e.g.,
minutes are publically available, but in other cases they do not
appear to be so or at least are not easily accessible.  
Indigenous engagement in groups, as opposed to a scope that
includes indigenous interests, varies significantly. For Australian
cases, Glenelg-Hopkins Catchment Management Authority
Advisory Group (GH) and Fitzroy Basin Community Reference
Panel (FB) are the only groups with Aboriginal membership,
although nothing precludes Aboriginal peoples’ membership in
other groups. The inclusion of Tangata Whenua (indigenous
peoples from a particular area) in all New Zealand arrangements
described here can be viewed as an assertion of values and
responsibilities upheld through recognition of the Treaty of
Waitangi (for additional detail see Jacobson et al. 2014 and the
discussion).  
New Zealand arrangements toward the cogovernance end of the
continuum are based on government-indigenous partnerships. In
the case of TWGG, this represents a layering of arrangements
building from a joint-management arrangement of the riparian
lake margin as specified in treaty settlements, toward engagement
in the Zone Implementations Programme, which effectively
attempts to manage the quality of water entering the lake, and
further through the nonstatutory cogovernance arrangement and
associated Whakaora Te Waihora Cultural and Ecological
Restoration Program (covering core tributaries and the lake),
which together recognizes the interests of Tangata Whenua as a
government partner, and enables them to fulfil cultural
responsibilities and provides for cultural values, e.g., food
resources. A similar scope is provided for through the WRA.
Management
The main pattern observable along the continuum is inherently
due to the broadening responsibilities beyond management plan
development to include monitoring and reporting (Table 6).
Arguably though, planning inherently involves a degree of
evaluation. Country differences were more apparent. All
Australian groups have specific monitoring and reporting
responsibilities, either through self-assigned responsibilities
(FPRH and DEP), or as required by state or other external parties,
e.g., Lower Limestone Coast Water Allocation Plan Reference
Group (LLC). These responsibilities are generally around
outcome monitoring and reporting. Typical reporting is annual
but for some it is quarterly (DEP), and others biennial (SRT).
Both DEP and FPRH utilize healthy waterways report cards. A
report card system is being implemented for the WRA (John
Quinn, National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research,
Hamilton, 4 September 2015, personal communication), and
another has been implemented for Te Waihora Lake Ellesmere
and was reported at the biennial living lake symposia (Lomax et
al. 2015). In New Zealand, monitoring is typically less
prescriptive, with no specified requirements for Selwyn Waihora
Zone Committee (SWZC), TWGG, or TANK. The WRA reports
annually. Collaborative arrangement monitoring (see Izurieta et
al. 2011) is only explicit for the SRT.
DISCUSSION
We discuss insights from this assessment through reflecting on
the following: (1) Lessons for management of waterways in
Australia and New Zealand; (2) Framework application; and (3)
Relevance to international audiences.
Lessons for Australia and New Zealand
Although our assessment focused on collaboration, this can be
further disaggregated into decision making (i.e., governing),
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Table 6. Categorization of collaborative groups along the consultation/government-based to cogovernance continuum: Management.
 
implementation, and regulation (i.e., management). Our
framework assessed collaboration with regard to both of these.
Nkhata and Breen (2010) distinguish between governance and
management cycles, positing that a governance learning cycle
involves articulation and sharing of values, the development of
policies and agreements, the enactment of those policies and
agreements, and their monitoring and evaluation. The
management learning cycle involves objective setting and
planning, action taking, and monitoring and evaluation.
Coupling of the two depends on effective information flows,
addressing and resolving (if  possible) competing interests, and
lesson sharing. Collaborative management arrangements have an
inherent role to play in linking the two learning cycles. Thus,
although arrangements of limited scope might serve governance
learning purposes, they are unlikely to support effective
management learning, particularly where monitoring and
evaluation of process and/or outcome are missing. In examples
where a succession of arrangements has occurred and/or
polycentric arrangements exist, e.g. Te Waihora and Fitzroy
Basin, there is a need for ongoing and collaborative monitoring
and evaluation of outcomes and processes to ensure activities link
and align.  
Our analysis identifies lessons for water managers in both
countries but with potential application also elsewhere. New
Zealand policy makers could strengthen their collaborative
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approaches by including more emphasis on monitoring and
evaluation of the group’s progress and management outcomes,
despite the fact that the WRA is very strong on this element. Such
requirements appear absent from the three other New Zealand
cases examined. Equally, Australia could think more about
broadening the mandate/scope of collaborative approaches so
that a more integrated approach to water resource management,
including land use, is undertaken. Another opportunity that could
be taken in Australia is to more fully embed the collaborative
processes to include plan implementation, monitoring, and
reporting. Finally, more consideration could be given to taking a
more inclusive approach to group membership where appropriate,
i.e., by including more community representatives, such as from
environmental and recreational interests. These responses
highlight jurisdictional biases evident in the practice of
collaborative freshwater management, in terms of the actual
things people collaborate on, and the capacity of collaborators
to learn from the outcomes of their decisions.  
Perceptions of water scarcity are arguably a key economic driver
of the development of these collaborative processes, in both
countries. Ongoing drought in Australia has hastened reforms
targeted at greater coordination of water management regimes
across jurisdictions. State, federal, and intergovernmental reforms
were hastened by the Millennium Drought that was experienced
throughout much of Australia from the mid-1990s to
approximately 2010 and likely played a greater role in hastening
government-led water reform (Smith 2015) resulting in a high
number of top-down water planning processes, e.g., Katherine
Water Advisory Committee (KWAC) and FB. Droughts along
the eastern side of the South Island and in the Hawkes Bay
(TANK) of New Zealand have been one of several drivers leading
regional government to invest in and promote collaborative
approaches through regional strategies, e.g., the Canterbury
Water Management Strategy within which the SWZC sits.  
In parts of both countries, e.g., the Waikato River (Waikato
Regional Council) and Tasmania (DEP), water quality and other
environmental drivers are more important. For example, the
impacts of Tasmania’s forest legacy (Jacobson et al. 2014), and
ongoing concerns about nutrient loading affecting water quality
in Lake Taupo and the Waikato River system (WRA), and in the
Canterbury Plains (TWGG) tend to override water quantity
concerns. To some extent, these drivers have been complemented
by national fora such as the New Zealand government initiated
Land and Water Forum (a multistakeholder initiative advising
government on policy initiatives) and the National Policy
Statement for Freshwater Management (Ministry for the
Environment 2014). Australia’s regional approach to natural
resource management, also implemented through intergovernmental
agreement (Head and Ryan 2004, Curtis et al. 2014), renders
regional organizations an appropriate scale for water
management (e.g. GH, LLC, KWAC, SRT).  
Social drivers also significantly impact collaborative management.
Australia has a long tradition of community engagement in
community based natural resource management, most likely
because of a lack of regional government, which led to the
statutory formation and substantive business development of
previously catchment based “care” groups (Curtis et al. 2014). It
is unsurprising that community engagement exists in cases like
SRT and DEP where there has been strong historic engagement,
but where funding has waxed and waned. Indigenous cultural
considerations are a key driver of the clustering of New Zealand
cases toward the cogovernance end of the continuum.  
New Zealand’s National Policy Statement for Freshwater
Management (Ministry for the Environment 2014) directs
councils to “involve iwi [tribes] and hāpu [subtribes] in the
management of fresh water and freshwater ecosystems in the
region” (Ministry for the Environment 2014:18). Water is a tāonga
(treasure) for Māori in New Zealand and the mauri (life force) of
water is an important driver of ongoing Māori grievance. Tangata
Whenua commonly identify issues around freshwater
management including the mixing of waterways (both water
courses and the release of human waste into streams, rivers, and
lakes), the health of food resources, and the mauri of water
(Memon and Kirk 2012). For example, the Waikato-Tainui Iwi
Management Plan “Whakatupuranga 2050” (a nonstatutory
planning document) identifies that “waterways are living
embodiments of our tribal identity” (Te Kauhanganui o Waikato
Incorporated 2013:4) and likewise the Maahanui Iwi
Management Plan (Jolly and Ngā Papatipu Rūnanga Working
Group 2013:75) covering TWGG and SWZC areas identifies that
“water is a significant cultural resource that connects Ngāi Tahu
to the landscape and the culture and traditions of the Tūpuna
[ancestors],” noting that current water governance and
management has failed, and that a change is needed in the way
in which water is valued. Because Treaty of Waitangi claims are
progressively being negotiated, there is an increasing range of
outcomes with implications for specific catchments. The WRA is
a specific outcome of three such settlements and reflects then an
ongoing commitment to cogovernance by the national
government and Iwi, in a similar way to which the TWGG sets
up a process for such arrangements for Tangata Whenua from
Ngāi Tahu. This driver helps explain the development in New
Zealand of specific and strong collaborative arrangements at the
cogovernance end of the continuum.  
Unlike Māori in New Zealand, it is difficult to make
generalizations about the importance of water to Australian
Aboriginal peoples given the cultural diversity that exists. A
second issue is the limited extent (geographical and temporal) of
formally recognized native title, and even when native title exists,
Durette (2008) argues that the legislative provisions are difficult
to uphold given the lack of common law recognition for spiritual
relationships with country (including water). Although there is
low Aboriginal engagement in collaborative groups we reviewed,
provisions do exist within the National Water Initiative for
indigenous and cultural values for water, under the auspices of
environment and other public benefits.  
Water plans and planning can (1) incorporate indigenous social,
spiritual, and customary aims and strategies for achieving them;
(2) take account of the possible existence of native title rights to
water in the catchment or aquifer area; (3) potentially allocate
water to native title holders (albeit this right appears secondary
to commercial values); and (4) account for any water allocated to
native title holders for “traditional cultural purposes” (Jackson
2007:63). These processes have however been criticized as
struggling to adequately account for Aboriginal interests and
rights (Ayre and Mackenzie 2013). Along with multiple examples
detailed by Jackson (2007), other instances include Guditj Miring
(whose native title and land rights have been settled) who are
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engaged in three other cooperative development, management,
and planning processes operating at the landscape scale in the GH
catchment area (see Appendix 1); in South Australia (but not
specifically the LLC) significant recent work has been done
exploring cultural values associated with water (Nursey-Bray and
the Arabana Aboriginal Corporation 2015), and in the land area
above the Tindall Limestone Aquifer (KWAC), the Jaowyn
people are actively engaged in management of natural resources
including National Parks (Nitmuluk) for spiritual and cultural
purposes. Thus, water may be a tacit part of other engagement
opportunities that exist for traditional owners to express their
rights and responsibilities for its management. However, the
commitment to do so is weaker than in New Zealand, where treaty
settlement, formal agreements outside of treaty settlement, and
the Resource Management Act 1991 (Government of New
Zealand 1991) provisions provide significantly stronger
opportunities, including for fully devolved management (see
Jacobson et al. 2016a).  
Despite legal recognition of indigenous rights, e.g., through the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, both
countries have been slow to operationalize recognition, as have
Canada and the USA (see for example Lightfoot 2008). Perhaps
unsurprisingly then, the comparative analysis reported here
indicates variable inclusion of indigenous interests. It is clear that
with the increasing emphasis on cogovernance and management
opportunities, will come an expectation of achieving high levels
of emphasis for recognition of cultural values and associated
explicit inclusion of indigenous representation in governance.
Such a pattern has emerged in New Zealand but not so clearly in
Australia.
Framework application
The framework was constructed as a way of classifying a selection
of existing collaborative approaches to water resource
management across Australia and New Zealand. Eleven groups
(seven in Australia) were examined and were fitted to the
continuum from government (consultation/government-based)
to devolved power sharing (cogovernance). Five of the groups
could be described as primarily consultative in nature because
they were tasked with advising on or making recommendations
about the content of a particular planning document and thus
typically had a shorter time frame and narrower scope, i.e., groups
were at best engaged for shorter periods of time, albeit not for
less important activities. The remaining six groups can be
considered as arrangements more closely aligned with
cogovernance, with three of the four New Zealand groups in these
categories. Notable in this grouping is the greater scope, higher
level of specified involvement of indigenous peoples, clarity of
monitoring and reporting (especially in Australia), and ongoing
involvement with more than just planning. Our cogovernance
category is novel in terms of the power sharing continuum derived
from Sen and Nielsen (1996) and Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004),
in that it does not necessarily imply direct involvement in actual
management implementation, but operates at a relationship and
strategic direction setting level, with government and tribal
organizations responsible for management implementation.  
Our framework extended Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004), given
that comanagement varies in relation to other factors as well, such
as participation scope, formality, and focus on governance and
or management. Our framework differs from Hill et al. (2012),
because some of the arrangements do not include intercultural
purpose, and because we do not consider scope, governance, and
management variations as continua. That being said, our
indigenous-government partnerships would also not easily align
with their typology. First, the Waikato River Authority is
specifically a partnership with different components that arguably
have different intercultural purposes, such as fisheries
management under the Fisheries Act 1996 (Government of New
Zealand 1996) as opposed to recommendation and endorsement
of a management plan. The intercultural purpose of TWGG is
clear though not easily placed along this continuum; it is a
partnership agreement that sets out to share power but not in a
way that denigrates the existing legislated responsibilities or
interests. It includes a set of collaboration processes in relation to
various functions of the members (rather than participation), and
it defines a new intercultural purpose of good faith and no
surprises, while not excluding further treaty or nontreaty-related
arrangements. Our framework elements also differ to Szabo and
Smyth’s (2003) elements that are more prescriptive about resource
ownership and property rights, as well as capacity development
within an indigenous-government partnership context.  
Many of our framework elements correspond with those in
Plummer and Fitzgibbons’s (2004) comanagement framework.
For example, we have considered resource- and rights-based
contextual drivers, in a more distinguished social, political,
economic, and environmental context. Our scope, governance,
and management elements are also similar to that of
preconditions, characteristics, and outcomes. However, our
analysis identifies that not all of these are relevant, appropriate,
or necessary as a means of developing a freshwater management
framework, and would, particularly if  component subcategories
are included, result in a very prescriptive framework that
overdifferentiates between examples and inhibits learning across
them.  
In comparison to Margerum and Robinson (2015), our analysis
reveals arrangements are more nuanced, and recognizes that one
arrangement can cover actions, organization and policy levels,
and be cooperative and collaborative depending on which level is
being considered (particularly for layered arrangements). Existing
typologies or frameworks of collaborative management therefore
do not fit neatly to the freshwater context revealed here.  
This comparison of frameworks is itself  interesting, highlighting
that framework design depends on the following: (1) the elements
perceived to be important to a given context, e.g., to indigenous-
government collaboration; and (2) the intended use of the
framework, e.g., detailed description or comparative analysis. In
our case, no clear patterns in management subelements emerge
across the continuum. For scope subelements, cogovernance
arrangements appear more enduring, but do not necessarily
include consideration of a broad range of values associated with
freshwater. For governance subelements, decision-making
mandate, indigenous engagement, and multisourced resourcing
were associated with cogovernance, but not whether the process
was statutory, transparent, or able to be adapted. We thus concur
with Fischer et al. (2014) that a more nuanced understanding of
comanagement that recognizes the historicity and evolving nature
of arrangements is necessary.
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Relevance to international audiences
Our results are also relevant elsewhere. For example, if  we were
to develop an “ideal type” for cogovernance, core ingredients
would include flexible but long-term arrangements, focused on a
specific array of values deemed important to partners, with
equitable resourcing. These are highlighted in arrangements for
the management of Auyuittuq National Park, Canada, but not
the binding nature of agreed decisions (see Jacobson et al. 2016b).
This ideal type also allows for parallel systems of governance,
coming together on issues of common interest; as argued for by
Fischer et al. (2014) in studies of comanagement of conservation
areas in Ethiopia, care needs to be taken in such cases to avoid
management by cooption. Our Te Waihora Governance Group
(TWGG) and Waikato River Authority (WRA) arrangements
appear to have achieved both of these, through multilayered
rather than evolutionary arrangements (TWGG), and clarity
provided through statutory negotiation (WRA). These
arrangements also address conflict tensions observed in South
Africa because of lack of agreement on material benefits from
comanagement and settlement of land claims (Thondhlana et al.
2016). Conflict has also been evident in the Haida Gwaii
settlement (Canada), where there is tacit agreement to disagree
on the nature of power-sharing under comanagement despite a
collaborative planning process (Takeda and Røpke 2010).
Although we applaud efforts for equity in stakeholder
representation in comanagement, we must also remember the
importance of social network structure (having the right people,
in the right place, at the right time) to comanagement success
(Crona and Bodin 2006); this is perhaps why there was no
discernible pattern in group membership breadth along our
continuum.  
Finally, our results build on Eberhard et al. (2017), who examined
water policy governance networks in six cases in Australia, France
and the United States based on governmentality theory. Their
work did not examine values nor the changing nature of
Indigenous 'power' in new and emerging arrangements, neither
within the context of governance or of management. Our
proposed framework sits within the context of effective
environmental management and provides a mechanism for policy
makers to rapidly consider the substantiative nature and choices
of design in collaborative management arrangements. This
contribution is testable and able to be adapted to context.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our research makes several important contributions.
Theoretically, it has developed a draft framework that has proved
beneficial in identifying commonalities but also important
differences both within and between countries. These differences
offer important insights to managers and policy makers and, in
particular, are linked to (1) strengthening monitoring and
reporting in the New Zealand context; and (2) more open and
inclusive governance processes and broader scope to identify
integrated solutions to water resource management issues, e.g.,
the exercise of indigenous rights and expectations, in the
Australian context. These likely apply to other international
jurisdictions, e.g., Canada and the United States, where there are
similar jurisdictional arrangements.  
Our analysis has indicated that the scope, governance
arrangements, and management functions of collaborative water
management in Australia and New Zealand are intrinsically
linked to national scale drivers. A shift toward greater partnership
status of arrangements (more common in New Zealand than
Australia) provides a more deliberative process, but not
necessarily one that is more democratic or representative of all
community interests in equal measure.  
Three main areas for future research can be identified. A
broadening of cases including from other jurisdictions would
further test the framework’s application. More in-depth, on-the-
ground analysis, would strengthen and potentially modify the
cross-cutting elements. Finally, disciplinary-focused evaluation of
specific elements would further refine them.  
Our framework identifies a provisional continuum from less to
more inclusive responses to various drivers of freshwater
management. Although we have focused on collaborative
arrangements, we are aware that the design principles of Ostrom
(1990) could refine the elements within the framework. The
significance of our analyses is that we are able to demonstrate a
means of comparison that captures the multilevel and polycentric
nature of collaborative arrangements evident in Australian and
New Zealand freshwater management.
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